The basic condition for Sharia is an islamic state, or Caliphate. This condition is mostly absent in the West, and is even lacking throughout the wider Muslim world, except in places like Saudi Arabia, Iran, provinces of Afghanistan and Pakistan. A Caliphate has not ruled in the Muslim world since at least the demise of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924.
The project of the Muslim Brotherhood is to reinstate a Caliphate.
Al-Qaradawi is the undisputed leader of the Global Muslim Brotherhood, the movement’s uber-authority. Based in Qatar, his ultimate, avowed goal is to have the islamic law (Sharia) enforced world-wide. Al-Qaradawi is fully committed to “the spread of Islam until it conquers the entire world.”
“The Muslim Brotherhood is a global movement whose members cooperate with each other throughout the world, based on the same worldview — the spread of islam, until it rules the world.”
— Mohammed Akef, Former Supreme Guide, International Muslim Brotherhood
Within the West, there are two separate and conflicting strains of islam: that of the Salafists, and that of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Salafists adhere to a political theology that views muslims in the West as migrants in enemy territory, a realm they speak of as Dar al-Kufr (House of the Heathen) or Dar Al-Harb (House of War) — as opposed to Dar al-Islam. Some Western-based Salafist groups openly espouse violent jihad to actualize the Caliphate, whereas others, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, concentrate on non-violent activities, believing that violent jihad should be postponed until the day when their demographic numbers will be sufficient enough for a full-spectrum offensive against the infidels.
The religion [of Islam] was destined to rule both races of the globe, mankind and demons.
— King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz al Saud
In contrast to the Salafists, there is indeed a doctrine — known as Wasatiya — that emphasizes the use of ijtihâd, or discernment, in Sharia matters — independent of what is literally prescribed in islamic scripture. This doctrine, first formulated by al-Alalwani, does not differentiate between Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam.
Taha Jabir al-Alalwani, the founder and former chairman of the Fiqh Council of North America, is among the most influential muslim preachers in the United States.
“Commitment to the Koranic concept of Geography: The land belongs to Allah, his religion is Islam, and every country is already in the House of Islam — now in the present time — since they will be in the House of Islam by force in the near future. The whole of humanity is a Muslim Nation (Ummah): it is either ‘the religion of the nation’ which has embraced this religion [Islam], or a ‘proselyte nation’ which we are obliged to conquer.”
— Alalwani, The Jurisprudence of Muslim Minority Affairs. No. 7, quoted here
Alalwani is the precursor of Muslim Minority Affairs, thought of as a doctrine for muslims confined to circumstances where sharia can’t be implemented. The use of this doctrine requires an understanding of social sciences, he said, especially sociology, demographics, economics, political science and international relations — since the fundamental predicate of this doctrine is that the whole earth is a muslim land, and the whole of humanity a muslim nation.
That doctrine produces a muslim jurisprudence that is allowing its muslim adherents to adopt a pragmatic approach to the task of spreading islam in the Western world. It is revaluating the islamic perception of the West as a Land of War, to conceive it rather as a realm for islamic proselytizing, for dawah.
In islamic states, there is hardly any debate on the application of the hudud punishments prescribed in Sharia — including stoning for adulterers and apostates, and for thieves, the amputation of the guilty hand — since those punishments are explicitly sanctioned in the Koran and the Sunna.
But if all muslim scholars agree that the hudud punishments are commanded by islamic scripture and cannot be abandonned, Alalwani has concluded that the hudud penalties are only to be applied in the context of an islamic state. The enforcement of these punishments is a duty upon muslim leaders, he says, not upon individuals. No muslim individual is allowed to carry out the hudud punishment without the permission of the local muslim leader. But where there is no such a muslim leader in command, the enforcement of hudud punishments has to be postponed and upheld.
Those Sharia punishments are not to be abandoned, rejected or cancelled, — only to be postponed or upheld due to special circumstances, such as muslims living as minorities in non-islamic states. The doctrine of Wasatiya calls for the suspension of practices or for establishing exemptions with regard to a literal application of Sharia in the West.
Known in Arabic as fiqh alaqaliyyat, the muslim minorities’ jurisprudence was developped among fuqahā (scholars of Sharia and its jurisprudence). Its oldest precedent was set by the second caliph, Umar ibn Al-Khattāb, who suspended the application of the hadud penalty for thievery in a time of famine, while a state of emergency was declared.
The use of ijtihâd in minority jurisprudence can allow muslims to postpone the application of the hudud punishments, — in order to focus instead on enforcing hudud through dawah.
Salafists rail against what they perceive to be Wasatiya’s “compromise” with the West, asserting the use of ijtihâd takes too many liberties in the application of Sharia, and erodes the unity and authenticity of the Muslim Nation. Qaradawi, the leading clering on Wasatiya along with Alalwani, has personally drawn the ire of Salafists worldwide, including Zarqawi and Zarawihi, the leader of al-Qaeda.
The Wasatiya movement is rooted in the thought of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and his teachings on the “wholesomeness of Islam,” which hold that Sharia must dominate every realm of human activity and thought.
As part of their dawah effort, Qaradawi and others Wasatiya-Sharia scholars, have built-up (often with the money of Saudi financial-backers) a vast network of institutions in the West: think tanks, media outfits, educational centers, and Sharia councils.
In 2004, Qaradawi presided over the inaugural meeting of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) in Dublin, Ireland.
Qaradawi now presides over the IUMS, which was founded to be the world’s leading Sharia authority.
One of the IUMS’s principle missions is to provide a central location for the strategic coordination of efforts worldwide to islamize the West through television, the Internet, publishing houses and other media outlets. The purpose of this endeavor, Qaradawi has said, is the conquest of the West not by “the sword or armies, but by preaching and ideology.”
Qaradawi has also said that short of full conquest, a more realistic goal would be the establishment of autonomous islamic communities within the West (such as the self-enclosed islamic ghettoes of France, the Netherlands, Great Britain and elsewhere in Europe), operating not in accordance with Western law, but under Sharia.
Created by Qaradawi. Launched on June 24, 1997. It ranks #14 on Alexa.
The website Islamonline.net (IOL), a key component in the massive internet, television, and publishing empire presided over by al-Qaradawi, provides a live and archived “Fatwa Bank” wherein islamic scholars offer guidance to Muslim Minorities in the West on what is permitted (halal) and what is forbidden (haram). Most of the participating scholars are members of two largest Western-based Sharia councils — the Fiqh (Islamic Law) Council of North America (FCNA), established in 1988, and
the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), which was co-founded in 1997 by Qaradawi, who presently serves as president.
Both the FCNA and the ECFR follow the doctrine of minority jurisprudence that was formulated originally by Alalwani and popularized later by Qaradawi, who began by publishing this manifesto for the Muslim Brotherhood.
Muzammil Siddiqi, chairman of the FCNA and member of the Muslim Brotherhood
Fiqh al-aqaliyyat is not simply a jurisprudence designed to help muslim minorities adapt to life in non-islamic states. It also seeks to provide a systematic way of organizing and defining islam in the West that accords with the Muslim Broterhood’s project of transforming Western lands into Islamic ones.
In an article in the UK-based Saudi paper “al-Saraq al-Awsat” from the 18th of January 2000, Al-Alalwani mentioned a meeting with Saudi King Fahd in the 1980s.
He spoke then of a new legal doctrine which would assist in spreading islam and bring about the “Settling-down of Islam after the Settlement of Muslims in the West” (Tawtin al-Islam ba’ad Istitan al-Muslimin fi al-Gharb). In that essay, al-Alalwani states two duties that warrant the initiative.
Coats of arms: House of Saud (left) and Muslim Brotherhood (right)
The first duty is to help the Muslim Brothers as they proselytize and expand Islam’s realm in the West. This dawah aims both at securing new converts and at instilling among muslim minorities a sense of political and cultural obligation to the Muslim Nation. It entails building institutions such as mosques, schools of Arabic, political organizations, and educational and cultural centers.
The second duty mentioned by al-Alwani is to protect the muslim minorities in the West from deviating from Sharia. What qualifies as deviation is for the jurists of the Internation Union of Muslim Clerics, the Fiqh Council of North America and the European Council for Fatwa and Research — all controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood — to determine.
We know that King Fahad bin Abdul Aziz al Saud adopted Wassatiyya as his own personnal brand of Islam because Whalid Shoebat found a fascinating document, a “Saudi Manifesto,” commissioned by the late King, entitled “Efforts of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques [Mecca and Medina], King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, In Support of Muslim Minorities.”
According to this Manifesto (page 6 & page 23), Saudi Arabia sponsored the Muslim Minority Affairs Institute, under the umbrella of the Muslim World League (MWL), the International Islamic Council for Dawa’a and Relief (IICDR) and the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY), among other Saudi-backed organizations.
WAMY was created in 1965, during the Hajj, through the collaboration of Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood, under the leadership of Said Ramadan, Ahmad Bahefzallah (the Abedin’s immediate boss), and financiers like Abdullah Omar Naseef.
[See “The establishment of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth by Dr. Salih Mahdi al-Samarrai, President of the Islamic Center of Japan: here in Arabic, and here in English via Google-Translate.
“الدكتور سعيد رمضان رئيس المركز الإسلامي في جنيف حيث كان في حينه ذا علاقات قوية بالمنظمات الشبابية والطلابية في العالم.”
Dr. Said Ramadan, head of the Islamic Center in Geneva where he was at the time an effective organizer of islamic youth and student associations in the world.]
The primary goal of WAMY was to give muslim youth access to the islam advocated by the Saudis. By focusing on muslim youth, the group was trying to ensure that it played a role in shaping the habits of future generations of Muslims. Like the Muslim World League, the Assembly partnered with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Walid Shoebat also cites an Arabic Dictionary on Media Icons showing the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs hierarchy, supervisors and parent organizations, as it is described in the Saudi Manifesto:
Sayed Z. Abedin is a specialist on Muslim Minority Affairs issues…
Sayed Zaynul Abedin, the father of Huma Abedin, and Saleha Mahmood Abedin, her mother, are indeed specialists on Muslim Minority Affairs issues.
In the early 1970’s, Sayed Z. Abedin went to Saudi Arabia for one year as a visiting professor. He was welcomed by King Abdulaziz University, which provided him the means to create a scholarly program regarding Muslim Minorities. Dr. Abdullah Omar Naseef, the Dean of King Abdulaziz University then envisioned the creation of an academic entity called the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs (IMMA).
On the Nasseef and the Muslim Minority Affairs, see here.
The IMMA would be under the management of Ahmad Abdul Qadir Bahafzallah, who was the General Trustee for the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). Professor Sayed Z. Abedin was encouraged to supervise the Muslim Minority Affairs and served as IMMA’s chief editor.
(p. 218, as translated by Walid Shoebat here)
The House of Saud believes in a Wahhabist plan set by the revivalist movement instigated by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) from Najd, Saudi Arabia.
Allah destined this region [Saudi Arabia] for an historic roll. So He commissioned the two Imams — Muhammad bin Saud and Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. But the times have passed on
Imam Muhammad bin Saud by the emergence of the reformer — Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. So the two Imams cooperated together to judge by what Allah brought forth, to fight against heresy and to bring Muslims back to puritan Islam.
— Saudi Manifesto, p. 8.
The Saudi Manifesto elaborates the need for a jurisprudence of muslim minorities, يوسف القرضاوي ـ في فقه الأقليات المسلمة, especially in Chapter II, “The Muslim Minority in the World: Understanding The Purpose of Muslim Minority.”
The document details how the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will catapult Islam’s
global dominance through the Muslim Minority Affairs by shifting the demographic scale to favor Muslims.
“The Muslim societies in all continents of the world exist in either ‘Muslim Nation’ or ‘Muslim Minorities’.
The assessment to determine what differentiates the a ‘Muslim Nation’ from ‘Muslim minorities’ is done based on a number of measures. First, the numbers scale, which is, if a nation has Muslims who exceed half the population and its Constitution states that Islam is its offcial religion or that Islamic Sharia is its source of law, this state is then considered an ‘Muslim Nation’.”
The Saudi Manifesto notices that “the number of Muslims has risen greatly in the last years,” “they became 1.3 billion Muslims.” “From these we have (900) million already in Muslim nations. The remaining 400 million live as communities and as Muslim Minorities.” It maps out, with statistics and demographic analysis, every nation on the face of the earth with Muslim minorities exist.
The Muslim Minority Affairs program, says the Manifesto, could organize “Muslim Minority activism” to advance the goal of dominance through the building of mosques, schools and islamic centers where muslim minorities exist (pp. 8-13, 17) in order to “establish a global Sharia in our modern times” (p. 9-10). The program also aims to “prevent the ‘hurdle’ Muslims encounter from ‘assimilation and melting’ into non-Muslim societies” (p. 24).
So Sayed Abedin was the chief editor of the Journal of the Muslim Minority Affairs Institute, whose overt objective is to steer migrant muslims into transforming non-muslim nations into islamic ones. The project goes like this:
— Recruit muslims that live in countries where muslims are still in minorities. Then help them establishing associations, educational programs and mosques in order to stop muslim assimilation to non-muslim cultures.
— Develop a global strategy and tactics able to shift the demographic scale in favour of muslims.
— Implement Sharia gradually, as the muslims become a more important demographic force.
— Work so that the actual non-muslim nations become finally ruled by the Sharia as understood by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Soon after the IMMA started, Naseef became the Secretary General of the Râbitat al-‘Alam al-Islâmî AKA the Muslim World League (MWL), based in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. [Yet Nasseef remained active in the IMMA for decades; he continued to be listed on the masthead as a member of the “advisory editorial board” at the IMMA’s journal until 2003.]
The MWL was established in 1962. Saïd Ramadan was one of the founders of the MWL. It was established under a decision issued by the World Muslim Congress, which was held in Mecca on 18 May 1962, and financed by Saudi crown prince (later king) Faisal bin Abdul Azizas.
Crown Prince Faisal employed many exiled members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the new organization and elsewhere in the Saudi bureaucracy and teaching system.
In the early 1970s, the Muslim World League followed the Arab migration into Europe. This marked the beginning of a period of intense growth: the League eventually opened offices in cities across Europe and North America, including Copenhagen, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Vienna, New York and Washington, D.C.
The Muslim World League frequently partnered with a network of islamic organizations in non-muslim lands to create a local islamic infrastructure. Much of this work involved funding the construction of mosques and funding the operations of islamic centers. To further its goals, the League often teamed up with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Originally based in Geneva, the MWL moved to Mecca after the Organization of the Islamic Conference was founded in 1969, with its headquarters in the Saudi city of Jeddah.
Under the auspices of the MWL League, Naseef founded the Rabita Trust in 1988, which is now formally designated as a foreign terrorist organization under American law due to its financial support of al-Qaeda. Naseef selected Wael Hamza Jalaidan to direct the Rabita Trust, a close associate of Osama bin Laden, who helped establish al-Qaeda’s network.
According to Osama bin Laden himself, the Muslim World League was one of al-Qaeda’s three top funding sources, along with the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and the International Islamic Relief Organization — two Saudi-backed organizations spawned by the MWL.
Sayed Abedin also served as a counsellor to the Muslim World League.
Huma Abedin, now deputy chief of staff to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, worked with her parents for the Institute of Minority Affairs as assistant editor from 1996 to 2008.
His wife Saleha Mahmood Abedin is also an academic and worked for the Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs (IMMA) from its inception. She took the journal over after Sayed Z. Abedin died in 1993, and she remains its editor to this day.
Their son, Hassan Abedin, another academic, is an associate editor at the Journal. He was also fellow at the Oxford Center for Islamic Studies in the United Kingdom when the Oxford Center’s board members included Abdullah Omar Naseef and Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi.
Saleha Mahmood Abedin is also the chairwoman of the International Islamic Committee for Woman and Child (IICWC).
Saleha Mahmood Abedin is a champion of Sharia law. She published and edited a book by Fatima Umar Naseef, Women in Islam: A Discourse in Rights and Obligations in 1999 which includes 22 citations to works by Sayyid Qutb.
Sayyid Qutb is a founding member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb became the Brotherhood’s leading theorist after the founder‘s assassination in 1949 — until he was executed himself by the Egyptian government in 1966.
Qutb held that anyone, even a Muslim, who didn’t followed the Muslim Brotherhood’s views was an apostate and thus could be killed.
Saleha Mahmood Abedin founded the Muslim Sisterhood, whose goal is to gain and acquire a unified perception in every nation of the world regarding the role of women under Sharia.
The goals of the Muslim Sisterhood are listed here and here.
The Abedins’ IMMA has been commissioned by the same entity that produced the Saudi Manifesto, whose goal is to serve Saudi Arabia’s interest by spreading islam and enforcing Sharia world-wide.
The Abedins’ Journal for Muslim Minority Affairs confirms here that their program stems from the same sources:
“Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat”—the jurisprudence of Muslim minorities—is a legal doctrine introduced in the 1990s by Taha Jabir Al-Alwani and Yusuf Al-Qaradawi which asserts that Muslim minorities, especially those residing in the West, deserve a special new legal discipline to address their unique religious needs that differ from those of Muslims residing in Islamic countries.